Accidents and Disasters by Satish Chandra

Author:Satish Chandra
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9789811999840
Publisher: Springer Nature Singapore

5.2 Engineering and Risk

The Royal Society Risk monograph (1992) states that risk truly is a probability that an event (adverse event) will occur at a given point in time or is a result of a particular process. The emphasis is that because probability is part of statistical theory, risk also satisfies all the formal laws of combined probabilities [25].

The engineering view of risk is based on scientific methods. For example, the life of an aircraft component is calculated based on scientific theories and tested accordingly, scenarios of possible failures simulated and assessed, through which probabilities are computed. As a tribe, scientists and engineers remain convinced that they will eventually be able to minimise risk through probability methods. This is interesting from the point of view of the Boeing 737 Max disaster. A statement regarding the probability of an event occurring being low (e.g. 1 in a million) could lead to various interpretations, leading to diametrically opposite conclusions and decisions such as “it is insufficient to warrant a risk” by some while “ít is an acceptable situation” by others. On the other hand, as the sense of being in a situation that is completely risk free is near impossible, these risk assessments do play a role in decision making at the individual and policy level, sometimes articulated, sometimes not.

However, sociologists see this in many ways as incomplete, as it does not account for human fallacies, social interactions, etc. In the work, risk and blame [19], Douglas makes the point very clearly: “when I tried to engage established risk analysts in conversation, I soon gathered that to emphasise these dubious uses of risk is perverse, a dirty way of talking about a clean scientific subject. Although they recognise that the grime and heat of politics are involved in the subject of risk, they sedulously bracket them off. Their professional objective is to get at the real essence of risk perception before it is polluted by interests and ideology. Risk analysts have a good reason for seeking objectivity. Like all professionals, rightly and properly, they do not wish to be politically biased: this is important for their clientele. To avoid the charge of bias, they exclude the whole subject of politics and morals. Reflecting their notion that right and wrong are not what “matters” [19]. Douglas and Wildavsky [20] emphasise that in a social setting, specialist opinions (experts in the subject, such as doctors and scientists in the pandemic) should be treated equally without the extra weight to their opinions, as risk is more than what they see. It is really social and reflects shared beliefs and values in organisations and communities. The author believes that this truly is the view of sociologists on scientists and engineers.

This is also in the context of the Boeing 737 Max accidents, where the risk analysis or hazard analysis did not take into account human behaviour, politics, social interactions, or the role the regulator in a social network of manufacturer, and regulator may play in ignoring the risks of noncompliance.

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